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This article provides an in-depth look at Treasury Regulation § 1.170A14(g)(6)(ii), known as the proceeds regulation. The proceeds regulation is intended
to protect the public investment in conservation if a perpetual conservation
easement that was the subject of a charitable deduction under Internal Revenue
Code § 170(h) is later extinguished. A proper understanding of the proceeds
regulation is critical because the public investment in deductible easements is
significant—billions of dollars are being invested in such easements annually—and
the regulation has recently been subject to challenges regarding its interpretation
and validity. This article examines the history and operation of the proceeds
regulation as well as possible alternatives. It explains that the proceeds regulation
provides a simple and easy-to-implement rule that avoids a host of future valuation
difficulties. It demonstrates that the proceeds regulation is neither irrational nor
inherently unfair to donors or subsequent property owners, and serves to temper
the perverse incentive that property owners may have to seek to extinguish
easements. This article concludes that the proceeds regulation provides a
reasonable solution to the difficult problem of ensuring that the conservation
purpose of a contribution will be protected in perpetuity as required by §
170(h)(5)(A).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970s, Congress experimented with the idea of authorizing a
federal charitable income tax deduction for the donation of conservation easements
that were temporary in nature. However, Congress quickly gave up on that
experiment as wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a matter of
conservation policy. Accordingly, in enacting Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §
170(h) in 1980, Congress limited the deduction to the donation of perpetual
conservation easements—those that are intended to permanently protect the
conservation attributes of the parcels they encumber. Specifically, Congress
required that a deductible easement be “granted in perpetuity,” and that “the
conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity.”1
Subsidization of perpetual conservation easements through the deduction
program raised a number of important questions, not the least of which was how to
address the possibility of a state court extinguishment of an easement if the purpose
of the easement became impossible or impractical to accomplish due to changed
conditions. Congress chose not to address that issue in § 170(h). Instead, it left it to
the Treasury to develop a regulation to ensure that, in the event of an
extinguishment, the conservation purpose of the contribution would nonetheless be
protected in perpetuity. The Treasury, for its part, promulgated Treasury Regulation
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii), referred to as the “extinguishment regulation,” which
addresses the limited circumstances under which a deductible perpetual
conservation easement can be extinguished and the manner in which the nonprofit
or government donee must be compensated for loss of the easement.
1

I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (h)(5)(A).
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This article focuses on the compensation component of the extinguishment
regulation, referred to as the “proceeds regulation,” and the controversy over its
interpretation and validity. The proceeds regulation mandates that, if a deductible
conservation easement is extinguished—which requires a judicial proceeding and
a finding that continued use of the subject property for conservation purposes has
become impossible or impractical—the nonprofit or government donee must be
entitled to at least a minimum percentage of the proceeds from a subsequent sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property (the “post-extinguishment
proceeds”).2 The minimum percentage is based on the value of the easement
relative to the value of the property as a whole at the time of the easement’s
donation.3 The extinguishment regulation provides that the donee must use its
percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution.4
The foregoing requirements seem sensible. By providing that the donee
must receive compensation if an easement is extinguished, and must use that
compensation to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere, the
extinguishment regulation protects the investment the public made in conservation
through the deduction program. The devil, however, is in the details.
In a number of recent cases, deductions were denied because the
conservation easement deeds provided for the value attributable to improvements
constructed on the property following the donation to be subtracted from any postextinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s minimum percentage
share.5 Taxpayers have objected to those holdings, arguing that the proceeds
regulation should be interpreted to permit subtraction of the value attributable to
2

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii).
Id.
4
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i).
5
See PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018); Coal Prop. Holdings,
LLC v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126 (2019); TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C.
Bench Op. (Dec. 13, 2019); Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 202054, Hewitt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-89; Plateau Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2020-93; Lumpkin One Five Six, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-94; Lumpkin HC,
LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-95; Vill. at Effingham, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2020-102; Riverside Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-103, Maple Landing, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-104; Englewood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020105; Smith Lake, LLC, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107; Belair Woods, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112; Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2020-115; Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116; Glade Creek Partners,
LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-148. In some of the cases, the conservation easement deeds
also called for the subtraction of any post-donation appreciation in the value of improvements that
had existed on the property at the time of the donation. See, e.g., Coal Prop. Holdings, 153 T.C.
126; Plateau Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-93; Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2020-112.
3
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improvements or, alternatively, that the regulation should be deemed procedurally
or substantively invalid.6 They have argued that it is unfair and irrational for the
donee of a conservation easement to be entitled to a percentage of the proceeds
attributable to, for example, a million-dollar home that the donor or a subsequent
property owner constructed on the property following the donation. They maintain
that such a rule amounts to donors and subsequent property owners making
unintended charitable contributions for which they receive no deduction.7
While those arguments have surface appeal, they are simplistic and ignore
important realities. This article provides an in-depth look at the history and
operation of the proceeds regulation, as well as possible alternatives. It
demonstrates that the proceeds regulation is not inherently unfair to donors or
subsequent property owners, nor is it irrational. A variety of unpredictable variables
can affect the amount of post-extinguishment proceeds to be divided between the
parties and, depending on the facts, the regulation can financially benefit donors
and subsequent property owners. There also are a number of rationale bases for the
formula in the regulation. For example, not subtracting the value attributable to
improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s
percentage share can temper the perverse incentive property owners may have to
seek extinguishment when an easement has appreciated in value relative to the
value of the property as a whole. The formula in the proceeds regulation is also
simple, easy-to-implement, and avoids significant future valuation difficulties that,
as a practical matter, would likely be addressed in a manner that would enrich
property owners at the public’s expense.
This article also addresses a number of other issues that are important to a
full understanding of the proceeds regulation. It explains why a voluntarily donated
6

See, e.g., Oakbrook Land Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 (Oakbrook I) and Oakbrook Land
Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (Oakbrook II), which are on appeal in in
the Sixth Circuit, and Hewitt, T.C. Memo. 2020-89, which is on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. In
Oakbrook II, a majority of the Tax Court, consisting of twelve judges, held that the proceeds
regulation was properly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (procedurally valid)
and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” (substantively valid). Oakbrook
Land Holdings, 154 T.C. No. 10. In Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir.
2015), the Tenth Circuit held that the mortgage subordination regulation was substantively valid,
explaining:
where Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate regulations
for the enforcement of the Code, ‘we must defer to his regulatory interpretations of the
Code so long as they are reasonable’… Here, the relevant regulations [Treasury
Regulations § 1.170A-14(g)(1)-(6)], specifically the mortgage subordination provision,
represent the Commissioner’s reasoned efforts to implement the Code’s requirement that
‘[a] contribution shall not be treated as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the
conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity.’
7
See, e.g., Oakbrook Land Holding, LLCs, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *38; Smith Lake, LLC, v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107, at *11-*12.
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conservation easement that satisfies the conditions imposed on the deduction does
not infringe on the state law property rights of the donor or a subsequent property
owner. It discusses the interaction between the proceeds regulation and laws
governing apportionment of condemnation awards, as well as the incorrect notion
that a conservation easement encumbers only the underlying land and not the
improvements thereon. It explains that the proceeds regulation establishes a brightline rule and the IRS and the courts should not be required to engage in a case-bycase, fact-specific, and inherently speculative inquiry into whether future
improvements would add value to a property. Also addressed is the unfortunate
misconception that, in enforcing the requirements of § 170(h) and the Treasury
Regulations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is “attacking” conservation
easement donations.8 The attack on conservation easements is not coming from the
IRS; it is coming from those who seek to take advantage of the § 170(h) deduction
while avoiding the conditions Congress imposed on the deduction to protect the
public interest and prevent abuse.
It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the procedural or substantive
validity of the proceeds regulation. However, the analysis herein will inform an
assessment of whether the regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statutory requirement that the conservation purpose of a contribution be
protected in perpetuity.9
The importance of a proper understanding of the proceeds regulation cannot
be overstated. The proceeds regulation protects the investment being made by the
public in conservation through the § 170(h) deduction program and that investment
is significant. The annual revenue loss from the deduction is in the billions of
dollars, and the deduction program ranks among the largest federal environmental
and land management programs in the U.S. budget.10 As of 2016, it was estimated
that we were spending almost as much on deductible conservation easements as on
the entire National Park System.11 Given that level of investment, it is crucial that
the rules governing its protection are sound and cannot be subverted by donors or
8

See infra Part IV.D.
See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A); supra note 6.
10
Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Cost of a Surprising Tax Shelter: The Syndicated
Conservation Easement, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/12/20/estimating-the-rising-cost-of-a-surprisingtax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservation-easement/. See also Syndicated Conservation-Easement
Transactions, Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Bipartisan Investigative Report, S. Prt.
116-44, at 2-3 (Aug. 2020), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFC%20%20Syndicated%20Conservation-Easement%20Transactions.pdf [hereinafter, Senate Finance
Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report]; Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design
Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 755, 756 (2013),
https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar/107/.
11
Looney, supra note 10.
9
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subsequent property owners. It also is important to minimize the possibility that
property owners will have a financial incentive to seek the extinguishment of
easements.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides some necessary
background. It explains the status of the § 170(h) deduction as an exception to the
general prohibition on charitable deductions for donations of partial interests in
property. It outlines the strict limits that Congress and the Treasury imposed on the
deduction to ensure public benefit and prevent abuse. It also provides a brief history
of the extinguishment regulation. Part III examines the operation of the proceeds
regulation and possible alternatives. It illustrates that the regulation is neither unfair
nor irrational. Part IV addresses the additional issues that are important to a full
understanding of the proceeds regulation. Part V concludes that, properly
understood, the proceeds regulation provides a reasonable solution to the difficult
problem of ensuring that the conservation purpose of a contribution will be
protected in perpetuity.
II. THE § 170(H) DEDUCTION
A. Partial Interest Donation
In 1969 Congress adopted a general prohibition on charitable income tax
deductions for donations of partial interests in property.12 Partial interest donations
are disfavored because they often involve abusive arrangements in which the
donors retain extensive control over the property and the public receives little
benefit.13 Congress made an exception to this general prohibition for conservation
easement donations when it enacted section 170(h) in 1980.14 However, Congress
imposed strict limits on the deduction to prevent abuse and ensure that the public
benefit provided would be sufficient to justify the public investment.15 Professor
Colinvaux explains:

12

Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201; I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A).
See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or
A Better Way, 74 DUKE J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 31-33 (2011),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1644&context=lcp; Colinvaux, supra
note 10 at 757-758.
14
See Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 755; I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(b)(iii), (h). See also Belk v.
Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The Code generally restricts a taxpayer’s ability to
claim a charitable deduction for the donation of ‘an interest in property which consists of less than
the taxpayer’s entire interest in such property.’… But it provides an exception to the general rule
for ‘a qualified conservation contribution’”).
15
See S. Rep. 96-1007, at 9, 10-14 (1980) (providing an in-depth explanation of congressional intent
regarding § 170(h) and its requirements).
13
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That the easement deduction was born as an exception to the partial interest
rule is critical to its design. Congress could simply have waived the partial
interest rules and left conservation easements to be treated like any other
contribution of real property. . . . A donor could arrange for a conservation
easement on property and contribute the easement to any charity for any
reason, and a fair market value deduction would be available. This is, after
all, how it normally works — with the oversight role of the IRS generally
limited to checking value.
But . . . Congress took a different approach and adopted a number of special
rules intended to address potential (and anticipated) problems.16
B. The Special Rules
To be eligible for a federal charitable income tax deduction under section
170(h), the donor of a conservation easement must comply with each of the
following requirements: (1) the easement must be a qualified real property interest,
defined as “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of
the real property”;17 (2) the easement must be contributed to a qualified
organization, defined to include a government entity or public-supported charity or
a subsidiary thereof;18 (3) the contribution must satisfy one or more of four
conservation purposes tests;19 and (4) the contribution must be made “exclusively”
for one or more of the four conservation purposes, meaning the conservation
purpose of the contribution must be protected in perpetuity.20
To satisfy the conservation purposes test, a deductible conservation
easement must be contributed for one or more of the following purposes: (1)
preservation of land for outdoor recreation by, or education of, the general public;
(2) protection of a relatively natural habitat; (3) preservation of open space for the
scenic enjoyment of the general public or pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy, provided the preservation will yield a significant
public benefit; or (4) preservation of a historically important land area or
structure.21
16

Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 758. See also STEPHEN J. SMALL, THE FEDERAL TAX LAW OF
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, 2-2—2-3 (1997) (“A taxpayer who donates an easement continues to
use and enjoy the property, and the requirements for taking an income tax deduction simply must
be tighter to ensure that there is also a significant long-term public benefit associated with the
donation”).
17
I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A), (h)(2)(C).
18
Id. § 170(h)(1)(B), (h)(3).
19
Id. § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(4).
20
Id. § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(5)(A).
21
Id. § 170(h)(4)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d).
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For the conservation purpose of a contribution to be protected in perpetuity,
the donation must comply with the no-surface-mining requirement in §
170(h)(5)(B) and each of the following regulations:22 the eligible donee
regulation;23 the restriction-on-transfer regulation;24 the no-inconsistent-use
regulation;25 the general enforceable-in-perpetuity regulation;26 the mortgage
subordination regulation;27 the future defeating events regulation;28 the mining
restrictions regulation;29 the baseline documentation regulation;30 the donee notice,
donee access, and donee enforcement regulations;31 and the extinguishment
regulation.32 The no-surface-mining requirement and the foregoing regulations
other than the extinguishment regulation are intended to ensure that the
conservation purpose of a contribution will be carried out through the conservation
easement in perpetuity or forever.33 The extinguishment regulation specifies the
limited circumstances under which an extinguishment can occur.34
To be eligible for the § 170(h) deduction, the donor of a conservation
easement also must substantiate the value of the easement by obtaining a qualified
appraisal.35 A qualified appraisal must, among other things, be prepared by a
qualified appraiser and in accordance with generally accepted appraisal standards.36
The appraisal also must comply with a number of special rules applicable to
conservation easements.37
22

See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1); S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 13-14. The
mortgage subordination regulation applies only if the property is subject to a mortgage on the date
of the gift of the easement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2). Although the baseline documentation
and donee notice, access, and enforcement regulations are applicable only if the donor “reserves
rights the [improper] exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the
property,” donors almost always reserve such rights, so those requirements apply to most easements.
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5).
23
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1).
24
Id. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
25
Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3).
26
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
27
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2).
28
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(3).
29
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(4).
30
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i).
31
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii).
32
Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii).
33
See, e.g., Hoffman Properties II LP v. Commissioner, 956 F.3d 832, 833 (6th Cir. 2020)
(perpetuity means “time without end; eternity” and in perpetuity means “endless duration; forever”).
34
See infra Part II.C.
35
Under IRC § 170((f)(11)(C), taxpayers are required to obtain a qualified appraisal for donated
property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A14(i) and (j); -16(d)(1)(ii); -17(a)(1).
36
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(1). For the definition of a “qualified appraiser”, see Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-17((b)(1).
37
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
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None of the foregoing requirements are optional. Congress and the Treasury
considered each of the requirements to be critical to the integrity and effectiveness
of the deduction program. Each requirement must be satisfied at the time of a
conservation easement’s donation, and compliance is indirectly policed by the IRS,
through the tax return review and audit process, and the courts, if the issue is
litigated.38 In addition, deduction requirements are generally strictly construed.39
C. History of the Extinguishment Regulation
Prior to enacting § 170(h) in 1980, Congress briefly experimented with the
idea of allowing deductions for donations of conservation easements that were
temporary in nature. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided the first statutory
authority for charitable deductions for conservation easement donations and it
authorized deductions for the donation of both perpetual easements and term
easements with a minimum term of 30 years.40 However, land conservation groups
such as The Nature Conservancy expressed concern that term easements would not
effectively promote conservation goals.41 They believed that term easements would
merely allow development pressures to build up over thirty years, at which time the
pressure to develop would be irresistible.42 They also were concerned that allowing

38

See, e.g., Palmolive Building Investors LLC v Commissioner, 149 T.C. 380, 405 (2017) (“The
requirements of section 170 must be satisfied at the time of the gift.”); Oakbrook Land Holdings,
LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (“Congress specified numerous requirements for a
“‘qualified conservation contribution,’” including the requirements that the contribution be made
“‘exclusively for conservation purposes’” and that the “‘conservation purpose [be] protected in
perpetuity.’”).
39
See INDOPCO Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (an income tax deduction is a matter
of legislative grace and “deductions are strictly construed”). Several circuit courts have applied
INDOPCO to § 170(h). See Minnick v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2015); Belk v.
Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 2014); Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148,
154 (2d Cir. 2014); Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, 744 F.3d 648, 653 (10th Cir. 2014). See also
Glass v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2006); RP Golf v. Commissioner, 860 F.3d
1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2017). Contra BC Ranch II v. Commissioner, 867 F.3d 547, 553-554 (5th Cir.
2017). There was a strong and persuasive dissent on this point (and others) in BC Ranch. See id. at
560-561. For a helpful history of court construction of deduction provisions and support for strictly
interpreting § 170(h)’s perpetuity requirements, see Bryan Camp, Lesson From The Tax Court: Not
Stopping The Perpetual Debate About Conservation Easements, TaxProf Blog,
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/09/lesson-from-the-tax-court-no-stopping-theperpetual-debate-about-conservatio.html (accessed Dec. 7, 2020).
40
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1919, § 2124(e) (1976).
41
See Stephen J. Small, The Tax Benefits of Donating Easements on Scenic and Historic Property,
7 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 315–16 (1979).
42
Id.
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deductions for term easements would discourage the donation of perpetual
easements.43
Allowing a deduction for term conservation easements was also ill-advised
from a tax policy standpoint because it provided an expensive subsidy to taxpayers
making long-term investments in land held for eventual development. Under the
1976 legislation, an investor making a 30-year investment in land on the urbanizing
fringe of a metropolitan region could receive a deduction for donating an easement
that would do little or nothing to advance conservation goals, given that the investor
did not intend to develop the land for thirty years in any event. Such a deduction
merely reduced the carrying costs of that type of investment.
Accordingly, Congress quickly dropped the idea of temporary easements as
wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a matter of conservation policy. In
the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Congress limited the deduction
to the donation of conservation easements that were granted in perpetuity.44
Congress then stuck to this policy when it made the conservation easement
deduction provision a permanent part of the Code in 1980 in the form of § 170(h),
and it included a new requirement—that the conservation purpose of the
contribution must be protected in perpetuity.45 Congress thus made a carefully
considered judgment not to authorize a deduction for the donation of temporary
easements and, instead, to require that deductible easements permanently protect
the parcels they encumber.46
Congress was aware, however, of the possible extinguishment of perpetual
conservation easements by state courts due to changed conditions. In anticipation
of a congressional hearing on proposed new § 170(h), the Joint Committee on
Taxation prepared a report in which it specifically raised the question of whether §
170(h) ought to include rules to cover the situation “where a transferred partial
interest in real property, for which a deduction was allowed because it served a
conservation purpose, ceases to be used in furtherance of the conservation

43

Id. at 304, 306.
Pub. L. 95-30, 91. Stat. 154, § 309 (1977).
45
Pub. L. No. 96–541, 94 Stat. at 3206, § 6(a).
46
In the legislative history of § 170(h), the Senate Finance Committee explained that, to satisfy the
new “protected in perpetuity” requirement, among other things, the perpetual restrictions in a
deductible conservation easement must be “enforceable by the donee organization (and successors
in interest) against all other parties in interest (including successors in interest)” and the easement
must “not be transferable by the donee except to other qualified organizations that also will hold the
[easement] exclusively for conservation purposes.” S. Rep. No 96-1007, at 14. See also Graev v.
Commissioner, 140 T.C. 377 (2013) (“In the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980 … Congress
amended section 170(f)(3) and added subsection [170](h), which have remained in effect since then
and work in tandem to keep the perpetuity requirement for conservation easement donations”).
44
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purpose.”47 In response to that question, the president of a prominent land trust, on
behalf of nineteen land trusts, advised:
We believe that with a well planned easement program this is most unlikely
to occur, but it is not impossible. It is conceivable for example, that a farm,
or a natural habitat, might become so closely surrounded by heavy industry
at some future time that it would become impossible to continue the original
conservation purpose. In such a situation the then owner of the land might,
under common law “change of circumstances” doctrine, obtain equitable
relief from the burden of the easement in court. Certainly if that were to
happen equity would seem to call for a return to the public of the price
originally paid for the public benefit provided by the easement, whether that
price had been paid directly by purchase or indirectly by a tax deduction. It
also seems very difficult, however, to provide for this unlikely occurrence
in the Revenue Code itself. We would hope that some Regulation for this
purpose could be developed by those most interested, i.e., The Revenue
Service and the Treasury Department, which would not interfere with the
main operation of the easement program.48
Congress did not include standards and procedures governing
extinguishment of deductible easements in the event of changed conditions in §
170(h), leaving it to the Treasury to address that issue in regulations. The Treasury
did so by crafting the extinguishment regulation, which is part of the final
regulations interpreting § 170(h) that were issued in 1986. The extinguishment
regulation provides as follows:
In general. If a subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding
the property that is the subject of a donation under this paragraph can make
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes, the conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected
in perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial proceeding and
all of the donee's proceeds [determined as provided in the following
paragraph] from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by
47

Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., Description of Miscellaneous Tax Bills Scheduled for
a Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and
Means on June 26, 1980, JCS-33-80, at 27 (Comm. Print 1980) (providing a list of seven issues that
were raised by the bill to enact section 170(h)).
48
Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 238, 245 (1980) (written statement of Samuel W. Morris, President,
French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, Inc., Pottstown, Pa., July 1, 1980, submitted on
behalf of nineteen land trusts).
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the donee organization in a manner consistent with the conservation
purposes of the original contribution.49
Proceeds. At the time of the gift the donor must agree that the donation of
the [easement]50 gives rise to a property right, immediately vested in the
donee organization, with a fair market value that is at least equal to the
proportionate value that the [easement] at the time of the gift, bears to the
value of the property as a whole at that time. . . . [T]hat proportionate value
of the donee's property rights shall remain constant. Accordingly, when a
change in conditions give rise to the extinguishment of [an easement] [as
provided in the preceding paragraph], the donee organization, on a
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject
property, must be entitled to a portion of the proceeds at least equal to that
proportionate value of the [easement], unless state law provides that the
donor is entitled to the full proceeds from the conversion without regard to
the terms of the prior [easement].51
The first paragraph of the extinguishment regulation—referred to herein as
the judicial proceeding regulation—limits extinguishment to “‘unexpected’ and
extraordinary circumstances”; a deductible perpetual conservation easement can be
extinguished only when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a court that
changed conditions have made continued use of the property for conservation
purposes impossible or impractical.52 This limitation carries out Congress’s
directive in § 170(h)(2)(C) that a deductible conservation easement be “a restriction
(granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.”53 That
is, a deductible easement must protect the conservation interests associated with the
real property it encumbers “in perpetuity” or forever, unless an unexpected change
in conditions makes it impossible or impractical to continue to do so.54
The second paragraph of the extinguishment regulation—the proceeds
regulation——mandates that, in the event of an extinguishment, the donee must be
49

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i).
The regulations use the term “perpetual conservation restriction” in lieu of conservation easement.
To avoid confusion and for brevity purposes, this article uses the terms conservation easement and
easement.
51
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
52
See Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 2014) (“absent these ‘unexpected’ and
extraordinary circumstances, real property placed under easement must remain there in perpetuity
in order for the donor of the easement to claim a charitable deduction”).
53
See id. at 227 (§ 170(h)(2)(C)’s “granted in perpetuity” requirement “means what it says: a
charitable deduction may be claimed for the donation of a conservation easement only when that
easement restricts the use of the donated property in perpetuity”).
54
See id. See also supra note 33.
50
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entitled to at least a minimum proportionate share of post-extinguishment proceeds,
and the judicial proceeding regulation requires that those proceeds be used in a
manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.
Those provisions are intended to carry out Congress’s directive in § 170(h)(5)(A)
that “the conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity” in
the event that an easement is extinguished.55 That is, if the conservation purpose of
a contribution can no longer be carried out through the perpetual easement due to
an unexpected change in conditions, the conservation purpose must nonetheless
continue to be carried out through the donee’s use of proceeds to advance similar
conservation purposes elsewhere.56
The extinguishment regulation appears to have been modeled on the
doctrine of cy pres, which applies to perpetual charitable gifts.57 Looking to the
doctrine of cy pres rather than the real property law doctrine of changed conditions
in this context makes sense. Deductible conservation easements are, by definition,
charitable gifts that are granted for specific purposes in perpetuity,58 and both
Congress and the Treasury were aware of the rules governing perpetual charitable
gifts when § 170(h) was enacted. At the congressional hearings on proposed §
170(h), and in response to the Treasury’s concern that charitable conservation
organizations might not properly enforce conservation easements, nineteen land
trusts submitted an appendix to their testimony in which they acknowledged the
status of deductible easements as “charitable grants” and noted the power and duty
of courts and state attorneys general to enforce such grants.59 Because of their status
as charitable grants, the terms of deductible conservation easements, including the
55

See supra Part II.B, discussing the protected-in-perpetuity requirement.
See Coal Property Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126, at *136 (2019) (“the [protected
in] ‘perpetuity’ requirement is deemed satisfied because the sale proceeds replace the easement as
an asset deployed by the donee ‘exclusively for conservation purposes.’”); Kaufman v. Shulman,
687 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2012) (the extinguishment regulation “appears designed in case of
extinguishment both (1) to prevent taxpayers from reaping a windfall if the property is destroyed or
condemned and they get the proceeds from insurance or condemnation and (2) to assure that the
donee organization can use its proportionate share of the proceeds to advance the cause of historic
preservation elsewhere”).
57
See Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 13, *9 (2011) (the extinguishment regulation
“appears to be a regulatory version of cy pres”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Kaufman
v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).
58
See I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A) (requiring a charitable “contribution” of a qualified real property
interest to a qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes). See also Carpenter v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *2 (“A charitable contribution is a gift of property to a
charitable organization, made with charitable intent and without the receipt or expectation of receipt
of adequate consideration.”).
59
See Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 238, 242 (1980) (App. to Testimony of French and
Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the Brandywine Conservancy, and other Conservation
Organizations in re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980).
56

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760530

terms specifying the limited circumstances under which the easements can be
extinguished, should be binding on both the property owner and the donee under
state law.60 That is, property owners and donees should not be able to mutually
agree to extinguish easements. In addition, under the doctrine of cy pres, in the
event of impossibility or impracticality, a court will direct that the charitable asset,
or proceeds attributable thereto, be used by the donee to advance similar charitable
purposes elsewhere.61 By contrast, when the real property law doctrine of changed
conditions leads to the termination of a servitude, such as in a residential
subdivision, there is seldom an entitlement to damages.62
III. THE PROCEEDS REGULATION AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
A. The Proceeds Regulation
1. How it Operates
The proceeds regulation mandates that, at the time of the gift, the donor
must agree that the donation of the easement gives rise to a property right,
immediately vested in the donee, with a fair market value that is at least equal to
“the proportionate value that the [easement] at the time of the gift, bears to the value
of the property as a whole at that time.”63 Both the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit
have determined that the “proportionate value” is a fraction equal to the value of

60
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *6 (gifts of deductible conservation
easements constituted restricted charitable gifts, which are “‘contributions conditioned on the use
of a gift in accordance with the donor's precise directions and limitations.’ Schmidt, ‘Modern Tomb
Raiders: Nonprofit Organizations' Impermissible Use of Restricted Funds’, 31 Colo. Law. 57, 58
(2002)”); Herzog Foundation v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997) (discussing
the general rule that charitable gifts are enforceable by state attorneys general and the courts). See
also Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, *15-*17 (explaining the need
to limit the ability of donors and donees of deductible conservation easements to declare “changed
circumstances” all by themselves and noting that, “[g]etting a judge involved means there will be a
third party to monitor whether conditions really have changed”).
61
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 67. The cy pres doctrine applies to gifts to charitable
corporations as well as to charitable trusts. See, e.g., In re Scott’s Will, 208 N.Y.S.2d 984, 988 (N.Y.
1960).
62
See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 7.11 cmt. c (2000). See also Oakbrook, T.C.
Memo. 2020-54, *15-*16 (the common-law rule of only implicit compensation for termination of
an easement “wouldn’t work with conservation easements” and “could embolden landowners
(imagine well-financed developers) to use the threat of protracted changed-conditions litigation to
coerce donees (imagine thinly staffed nonprofit organizations) into modifying or terminating their
easements.”).
63
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
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the conservation easement at the time of the gift, divided by the value of the
property as a whole at that time.64
The proceeds regulation further provides that “that proportionate value”
(the fraction) “shall remain constant” and, if an easement is extinguished as
provided in the judicial proceeding regulation, the donee, “on a subsequent sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the subject property, must be entitled to a
portion of the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate value,” with one
exception not relevant here.65 By providing that the donee must be entitled,
following extinguishment, to “at least” that proportionate value of the proceeds,
with that proportionate value established at the time of the gift, the proceeds
regulation establishes a floor—the donee’s share can never be less than that
minimum proportionate value (or fraction) of the proceeds, although it could be
more if the parties were to so agree.66
To illustrate the operation of the proceeds regulation, assume the following.
A conservation easement that complied with the requirements of § 170(h) and the
Treasury Regulations was contributed as a charitable gift to a qualified
organization. The fair market value of the subject property before the gift was
$1,000,000 and the fair market value of the subject property after the gift was
$700,000. Under the “before and after” valuation method described in the
regulations, the fair market value of the easement at the time of the gift was
$300,000.67
To comply with the proceeds regulation, the donor agreed in the easement
deed that, at the time of the gift, the donation gave rise to a property right,
immediately vested in the donee, with a fair market value that is equal to a fraction,
the numerator of which is the value of the conservation easement at the time of the
gift (in this example, $300,000), and the denominator of which is the value of the
property as a whole at that time (in this example, $1,000,000). The donor also
64

Carroll v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 196, 216 (2016); PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd v. Commissioner, 900
F.3d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 2018); Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54,
*8-*11.
65
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). An “involuntary conversion” is “[t]he loss or destruction of
property through theft, casualty, or condemnation.” BRYAN A. GARNER, ED., BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, (11TH ED. 2019), conversion. Accordingly, “the proceeds” in the case of an involuntary
conversion could be insurance proceeds or a condemnation award. For discussion of the exception,
see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
66
See, e.g., Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14 (“[t]he
[proceeds] regulation sets a minimum for the donee’s participation in extinguishment proceeds and
then, using the phrase ‘at least’, makes it explicit that a deed may be more generous to the donee
and still comply”).
67
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h(3)(i). For a discussion of the rules governing the valuation of
conservation easements for purposes of the § 170(h) deduction, see Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX. REV. 227, 231-246 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.
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agreed that this fraction, expressed as a percentage (in this example, 30%), shall
remain constant. The easement deed further provided that the easement can be
extinguished only in a judicial proceeding, upon a finding by the court that a
subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property has made
impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes, and, in such event, the donee will be entitled to at least that percentage
of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the
subject property, and must use those proceeds in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution.
Some years after the gift of the easement, and after the property had changed
hands, the easement was extinguished in whole in a judicial proceeding upon a
finding that continued use of the property for conservation purposes had become
impossible or impractical and the property, unencumbered by the easement, was
sold in an arm’s-length transaction for $5 million. In accordance with the terms of
the easement, the donee received 30% of those post-extinguishment proceeds, or
$1.5 million, and used the $1.5 million in a manner consistent with the conservation
purposes of the original contribution. The property owner received the remaining
$3.5 million of post-extinguishment proceeds.
The donee’s receipt of $1.5 million of the post-extinguishment proceeds and
use of those proceeds in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the
original contribution carried out Congress’s directive in § 170(h)(5)(A) that “the
conservation purpose [of the contribution be] protected in perpetuity.” Although
the conservation purpose of the contribution could no longer be carried out through
the easement, it nonetheless continued to be carried out through the donee’s use of
its share of the post-extinguishment proceeds to advance similar conservation
purposes elsewhere.68
In addition, by mandating that the donee be entitled to at least the specified
minimum percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds (30% of $5 million), as
opposed to an amount equal to the dollar value of the easement at the time of its
donation ($300,000), the proceeds regulation ensured that the donee received a
percentage of the proceeds attributable to the appreciation in the value of the
property as a whole following the donation (from $1 million to $5 million). If the
proceeds regulation limited the donee’s share of post-extinguishment proceeds to
the dollar value of the easement at the time of its donation, the donee would have
watched its proportion of potential post-extinguishment proceeds shrink over the
years as the property as a whole appreciated in value.69 Moreover, if some of that
appreciation were attributable to the easement, the property owner would have had
a perverse incentive to seek extinguishment. For example, if the encumbered
property and the easement had appreciated in value proportionally, such that, at the
68
69

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14.
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time of extinguishment, the value of the encumbered property was $3.5 million and
the value of the easement was $1.5 million, and the donee was entitled to only
$300,000 of the $5 million of post-extinguishment proceeds, the property owner
would have had an incentive to seek extinguishment to benefit from the $1.2 million
of appreciation attributable to the easement.
The proceeds regulation also should apply in the case of partial
extinguishments. For example, assume in the example above that, instead of a
wholesale extinguishment, a small strip of the encumbered property that adjoined
a road was condemned to widen the road for safety purposes.70 Assume also that
the condemning authority paid just compensation of $150,000 for the taking of both
the strip of the encumbered property and the portion of the conservation easement
encumbering that strip. Under the easement deed, the donee would be entitled to
30% of the condemnation award, or $45,000, and would be required to use the
$45,000 in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original
contribution. The property owner would be entitled to the remaining $105,000.71
2. No Subtraction of Improvements
In PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit sustained the
IRS’s disallowance of a deduction claimed for the conveyance of a conservation
easement because the easement deed did not comply with the proceeds regulation.72
The deed provided that, following extinguishment of the easement, the donee was
entitled to the correct percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds. However,
the deed also provided that, before calculating the donee’s percentage share, the
post-extinguishment proceeds had to be reduced by an amount attributable to
improvements constructed on the property pursuant to the property owner’s
reserved rights.73 The Fifth Circuit held that the easement deed did not comply with
the proceeds regulation because of the subtraction provision.74
The Fifth Circuit explained that, under the plain language of the proceeds
regulation, following extinguishment, the donee of a conservation easement “must”
be entitled to at least the mandated minimum percentage of “the proceeds” from a
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property, and “the
70

A condemnation is a “subsequent unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property.”
Treas. Reg. § 1.170(g)(6)(i).
71
See infra Part IV.B for a further discussion of apportionment of a condemnation award upon the
taking of land subject to a conservation easement.
72
PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018). The PBBM easement was
conveyed to the North American Land Trust and encumbered a 27-hole golf course in a gated and
guarded residential community in South Carolina. Id. at 198, 202. The taxpayer overvalued the
PBBM easement by more than $15 million. See infra note 99.
73
PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2018).
74
Id. at 207-209.
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proceeds” refers to “the total amount brought in from” such sale, exchange, or
involuntary conversion.75 The regulation, said the court, does not indicate that any
amount may be subtracted from “the proceeds” before calculating the donee’s
percentage share, including amounts attributable to improvements.76 The court also
pointed out that the regulation preceding the extinguishment regulation suggests
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue recognized that a donor may reserve
rights to construct improvements on the property post-donation, but chose not to
carve out an exception for the value attributable to those improvements in the
proceeds regulation.77
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in PBBM, the Tax Court denied
deductions on similar grounds in a number of cases, many of which involved
syndicated conservation easement donation transactions.78 In some of the cases, the
easements called for the subtraction from post-extinguishment proceeds of not only
the value attributable to improvements that a property owner constructed on the
property post-donation, but also post-donation appreciation in the value of
improvements that had existed on the property at the time of the donation.79
Taxpayers have argued that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the proceeds
regulation as it relates to improvements is incorrect or, alternatively, that the
regulation should be deemed procedurally or substantively invalid.80 They have
argued that it is unfair and irrational for the donee of a conservation easement to be
entitled to post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to the value of improvements
that were made and paid for by the donor and for which the donor did not receive a

75

Id. at 207-208 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 208. The PBBM easement also provided for the “actual bona fide expenses” of a sale to be
subtracted from the post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s share. Id. at 199.
While the Fifth Circuit did not directly address this subtraction, it did state that the plain language
of the proceeds regulation does not indicate that “any” amount can be subtracted from postextinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share. Id. at 208. Accordingly,
an easement deed should be drafted to entitle the donee to receive at least its mandated minimum
percentage of the total amount of the proceeds, the property owner would be entitled to the
remaining proceeds, and then each party could pay its share of the expenses out of the proceeds it
received.
77
Id. The regulation preceding the extinguishment regulation provides that, when an easement donor
reserves rights, “the exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the
property,” the donor must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made,
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the subject property at the time of the gift.
This documentation, generally referred to as “baseline documentation,” “is designed to protect the
conservation interests associated with the property, which although protected in perpetuity by the
easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.” Treas. Reg. § 1.170A14(g)(5)(i).
78
See supra note 5.
79
See id.
80
See supra note 6.
76
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charitable deduction.81
Building on the example above, in which the donee is entitled to 30% of
any post-extinguishment proceeds, the taxpayers would argue that, if the donor had
constructed a residence on the encumbered property post-donation, and the
property was sold following extinguishment of the easement for $6 million rather
than $5 million (with the additional $1 million attributable to the increase in the
property’s value as a result of the residence), it would be irrational and unfair for
the donee to receive 30% of the proceeds attributable to that $1 million increase
because the donor constructed and paid for the residence and the residence was not
the subject of a deductible charitable donation. They also would argue that it would
be even more irrational to require a subsequent property owner to forfeit to the
donee a portion of the proceeds attributable to improvements constructed and paid
for by the subsequent owner given that the subsequent owner did not donate the
easement or receive a charitable contribution deduction.
Those arguments are not persuasive when considered in light of the
unpredictable variables that can affect the amount of post-extinguishment proceeds
to be divided between the parties, as well as the undesirability of creating an
incentive on the part of property owners to seek to extinguish deductible perpetual
easements. Those arguments also do not take into account the significant challenges
that would be associated with determining the value attributable to improvements
or appreciation in the value of improvements at the time of an extinguishment.
a. Unpredictable Variables and Perverse Incentives
Conservation easements can appreciate in value relative to the value of the
property they encumber following their donation. In addition, many deductible
conservation easements are drafted to limit the donee’s share of postextinguishment proceeds to the minimum percentage required by the proceeds
regulation—the 30% in our example above. Although it is permissible for a
deductible conservation easement to provide that the donee is entitled to more than
the minimum percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds,82 because it is not
required, many easements are drafted to provide that the donee is entitled to only
the minimum percentage or to “at least” that percentage, in which case the payment
of a higher percentage to the donee would be in the discretion of whoever happens
to own the subject property at the time of extinguishment.83

81

See supra note 7.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
83
See, e.g., Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22, at *14 (the right under
an easement deed to receive “at least” a specified share means there is only a hope that there might
be more).
82
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If a conservation easement appreciates in value relative to the value of the
property it encumbers following its donation, and the donee’s percentage of postextinguishment proceeds is limited to the minimum percentage, then following
extinguishment, the property owner would receive the benefit of all of the relative
appreciation in the value of the easement. The ability to benefit from the relative
appreciation in the value of an easement may create a perverse incentive on the part
of property owners to seek extinguishments. Not subtracting the value of
improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s
percentage share may serve to temper that perverse incentive.
Another example is in order. Assume the same easement donation as
described above (in which the easement represented 30% of the value of the
property as a whole at the time of its donation), but years have passed since the
donation, the surrounding area has become urbanized, development pressures have
increased, and the fair market value of the property subject to the easement is now
$2 million, the fair market value of the property if the easement were extinguished
would be $5 million, and thus, the value of the easement is now $3 million, meaning
the easement now represents 60% of the value of the property as a whole. Assume
also that no improvements were constructed on the property post-donation, and
there has been no appreciation in the value of the improvements that existed on the
property at the time of the easement’s donation. A speculator purchases the
property, subject to the easement, in an arm’s length transaction for $2 million and
soon thereafter is successful in having the easement extinguished in a judicial
proceeding. The speculator then sells the newly unencumbered property for $5
million.
If the donee and the speculator were to receive post-extinguishment
proceeds equal to the value of easement at the time of the extinguishment and the
value of the property subject to the easement at that time, respectively, the donee
would receive $3 million and the speculator would receive $2 million. Under the
easement deed, however, the donee would be entitled to only 30% of the $5 million
proceeds, or $1.5 million, and the speculator would be entitled to the remaining
$3.5 million, even though the speculator purchased the property subject to the
easement for only $2 million. The speculator would benefit from the difference
between the percentage that the easement represented of the value of the property
as a whole at the time of its extinguishment (60%) and the percentage that the
easement represented of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its
donation (30%). In other words, the speculator would be entitled to the $1.5 million
of proceeds attributable to the relative appreciation in the value of the easement
(30% of $5 million).
The speculator’s ability to benefit from the relative appreciation in the value
of the easement could persist, at least in part, even if the donee is entitled to a
percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to the value of
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improvements. To illustrate, assume the same facts as in the preceding example,
except that a residence was constructed on the property post-donation, the
speculator purchased the property with the residence for $3 million, and the
property is sold following extinguishment of the easement for $6 million (this
assumes the residence increased the value of the property by $1 million). Under the
easement deed, the donee would be entitled to 30% of the $6 million of postextinguishment proceeds, or $1.8 million, and the speculator would be entitled to
the remaining $4.2 million of proceeds. Even though the value attributable to the
residence was not subtracted from the post-extinguishment proceeds before
calculating the donee’s share, the speculator would receive $1.2 million more than
her $3 million investment in the property and thus would still benefit financially
from the extinguishment.
As the Table below illustrates, on the facts of the example, the speculator
would receive more proceeds following extinguishment than she invested in the
property (that is, the speculator would profit from the extinguishment) provided
that the value attributable to the residence was less than $5 million. Only if the
value of the residence exceeded $5 million would the speculator receive less than
her investment upon extinguishment. In addition, the last column in the Table
illustrates that, if the value attributable to improvements were subtracted from the
post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s share, the donee
would never receive more than $1.5 million (30% of $5 million84), and the property
owner would always benefit from the full $1.5 million of post-donation relative
appreciation in the value of the easement.

84

$5 million is the value of the land unencumbered by the easement at the time of the extinguishment
if the increase in the land’s value due to the residence is not taken into account.
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Donation Values (No Residence)
Before-easement value of the land: $ 1,000,000
After-easement value of the land: $ 700,000
Easement value:
$ 300,000 (30%)

M = Million
D = Donee
S = Speculator

Extinguishment Values (No Residence)
Value of land unencumbered by easement: $ 5,000,000
Value of land encumbered by easement: $ 2,000,000
Easement value:
$ 3,000,000 (60%)
Increase
attributable
to
Residence85

S’s
Investment

Postextinguishment
proceeds86
$5M

Entitlements under
easement deed
(no subtraction of
improvements)
D: $1.5M (30% x $5M)
S: $3.5M ($1.5M profit)

None

$2M87

D: $1.5M
S: $3.5M ($1.5M profit)

$1M

$3M88

$6M

D: $1.8M (30% x $6M)
S: $4.2M ($1.2M profit)

D: $1.5M
S: $4.5M ($1.5M profit)

$2M

$4M

$7M

D: $2.1M (30% x $7M)
S: $4.9M ($ .9M profit)

D: $1.5M
S: $5.5M ($1.5M profit)

$3M

$5M

$8M

D: $2.4M (30% x $8M)
S: $5.6M ($ .6M profit)

D: $1.5M
S: $6.5M ($1.5M profit)

$4M

$6M

$9M

D: $2.7M (30% x $9M)
S: $6.3M ($ .3M profit)

D: $1.5M
S: $7.5M ($1.5M profit)

$5M

$7M

$10M

D: $3M (30% x $10M)
S: $7M (break even)

D: $1.5M
S: $8.5M ($1.5M profit)

$6M

$8M

$11M

D: $3.3M (30% x $11M)
S: $7.7M ($ .3M loss)

D: $1.5M
S: $9.5M ($1.5M profit)

If improvements
were subtracted

85
The values in this column represent the increase in the value of the land due to the residence at
the time of the easement’s extinguishment. It is assumed, for example, that if the residence increased
the value of the land encumbered by the easement by $1M at the time of the extinguishment, the
residence similarly increased the value of the land unencumbered by the easement by $1M at that
time.
86
The values in this column represent the value at extinguishment of the land unencumbered by the
easement ($5M) plus the increase in that value attributable to the residence.
87
This is the amount the investor paid for the land encumbered by the easement in an arm’s length
transaction.
88
This, and the remaining values in this column, represent the amount paid by the investor for the
land encumbered by the easement ($2M), as increased by the value attributable to the residence.
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The foregoing examples illustrate that, depending on the facts, not
subtracting the value attributable to improvements from post-extinguishment
proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share may not, in fact, be unfair
to donors or subsequent property owners—they may still receive more on
extinguishment than their investment in the property. Not subtracting the value of
improvements also enables the donee to recoup some or all of the proceeds
attributable to the relative appreciation in the value of the easement and, thus,
provides the donee with more proceeds to be used to advance similar conservation
purposes elsewhere.89 Moreover, not subtracting the value of improvements and
thereby reducing the profit to be made from an extinguishment can tamp down the
perverse incentive on the part of property owners to seek extinguishment of
easements.
Of course, relative appreciation in the value of a conservation easement is
only one of the variables that may impact the amount of post-extinguishment
proceeds to which the donee and property owner may be entitled at the time of
extinguishment. A conservation easement may also depreciate in value relative to
the value of the property as a whole following its donation. The value attributable
to improvements will also vary from property to property and with regard to the
same property over the perpetual life of an easement. Over the perpetual life of an
easement, improvements may be constructed and torn down, they may undergo
physical, functional, and external obsolescence, and they may require costly
demolition and removal. Moreover, it is impossible to predict, at the time of an
easement’s donation, whether an “unexpected and extraordinary” change in
conditions will cause the easement to be extinguished in whole or part, or when that
might happen, or the status of the foregoing variables at that uncertain future time.90
The goal of this subpart is not to argue that the proceeds regulation would
never operate to provide the owner of easement-encumbered property with less than
its financial investment in a property at the time of extinguishment. Rather, it is to
illustrate that claims that the proceeds regulation is irrational and unfair do not take
into account all of the unpredictable variables that may impact the amount of
proceeds to which the parties will be entitled, and do not acknowledge that,
depending on the facts, the regulation can financially benefit property owners. This
subpart also illustrates that the proceeds regulation can protect the public interest
when there has been relative appreciation in the value of an easement by both
reducing the incentive of property owners to seek extinguishments and allowing
donees to recoup some of the proceeds attributable to that relative appreciation to
be used to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere.
89
If a conservation easement appreciates in value relative the value of the property it encumbers,
the cost of pursuing similar conservation opportunities, whether through the purchase of similar
property or a similar easement, could be expected to similarly increase.
90
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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b. Avoidance of Valuation Difficulties
Allowing the value attributable to improvements to be subtracted from postextinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share would
give rise to a number of difficult valuation issues. For example, should the
definition of “improvements” be limited to permanent structures, such as
residences, guest houses, and barns? Or should the term be more broadly defined
to include, for example, temporary structures, ponds, trails, access roads,
driveways, utility lines (including water, septic, and power lines), irrigation
systems, fencing, grading, and landscaping?91 Should post-extinguishment
proceeds be reduced by only the value attributable to improvements that a property
owner constructed on the property post-donation, or also by post-donation
appreciation in the value of improvements that existed on the property at the time
of the donation, or both?92 Should improvements or appreciation in the value
thereof be valued as of the date of the extinguishment or the date on which the
unencumbered property is subsequently sold or exchanged?93 Should the value
attributable to improvements be determined by an appraisal and, if so, should the
appraisal be a “qualified appraisal” or meet other requirements?94 Who would
police satisfaction of any such requirements? Who should choose the appraiser,
define the scope of the assignment, and pay for the appraisal? What valuation
methods should be employed?95 And what should be done if the property owner
and donee did not agree on the values?96

91

See THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL (4TH ED., 2002, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE)
(Improvements may consist of buildings or other relatively permanent structures (such as residences
and agricultural structures), as well as other additions that make a property usable, such as access
roads, driveways, utility lines, irrigation systems, fences, and ponds).
92
Determining post-donation appreciation in the value of improvements that existed on the property
at the time of the donation could be particularly difficult if those improvements were not valued
separately in the qualified appraisal that was obtained at the time of the easement’s donation. A
retrospective appraisal of the value that improvements added to a property years in the past could
require an appraiser to attempt to determine values without readily available or reliable data.
93
Some time may pass following an extinguishment before the underlying property or portions
thereof are sold and post-extinguishment proceeds distributed.
94
See supra notes 35-37, referencing the qualified appraisal and conservation-easement specific
valuation rules.
95
A number of valuation methods might be employed to determine the value of an improvement,
such as the property owner’s cost in constructing the improvement, the estimated cost to replace the
improvement, the estimated cost to reproduce the improvement, or the extent to which the
improvement increases the value of the property. These different valuation methods may produce
different value estimates.
96
The fact that the proceeds regulation does not address any of these issues provides compelling
support for the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the proceeds regulation was not intended to permit
subtraction of the value attributable to improvements from post-extinguishment proceeds.
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The difficulties associated with addressing the foregoing issues would be
compounded by the fact that property owners and donees would have starkly
opposing interests regarding the value attributable to improvements. In addition,
donees, which serve as guardians of the public investment in deductible easements,
would often be at a disadvantage in arguing their position. Many nonprofit and
government donees have limited capacity and resources, and they also have a desire
to maintain good relations with property owners and avoid negative publicity in the
communities in which they work. Those factors could make it difficult for donees
to successfully challenge property owners’ overestimates of the value of
improvements. As a practical matter, subtracting the value of improvements from
post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s percentage share
would likely enrich property owners at the public’s expense and leave donees with
fewer proceeds with which to advance similar conservation purposes elsewhere.
The proceeds regulation avoids all of the foregoing issues. Under the
proceeds regulation, the donee must be entitled to at least a minimum percentage
of any post-extinguishment proceeds, and that minimum percentage is generally
determined based on the values set forth in the qualified appraisal the donor
obtained at the time of the easement’s donation. That qualified appraisal must
comply with numerous requirements and is subject to indirect policing by the IRS
and the courts at the time of the easement’s donation as part of the tax return review
and audit process.97 In addition, if there is a final settlement with the IRS or final
determination made by a court with regard to the percentage value of the easement
at the time of its donation, that percentage should control for purposes of the
proceeds regulation.
B. Easement Value at Extinguishment
One possible alternative to the formula in the proceeds regulation would be
to require that the donee of a deductible conservation easement be entitled to an
amount of post-extinguishment proceeds equal to the dollar value of the easement
at the time of its extinguishment.98 This alternative would appear to ensure that the
donee would receive the benefit of any post-donation relative appreciation in the
value of the easement, and that the property owner would receive only the dollar
value of the property subject to the easement at the time of the extinguishment.
There would, however, be significant drawbacks to this alternative.

97

See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
This alternative could be structured to entitle the donee to a percentage (rather than a dollar
amount) of post-extinguishment proceeds, with the percentage based on the value of the easement
at the time of its extinguishment relative to the value of the property as a whole at that time, but
such a rule would suffer from the same drawbacks discussed in this subpart.
98
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Because of the persistent problem of overvaluation of conservation
easements in the § 170(h) deduction context, which has been exacerbated by the
rise in the number of abusive syndicated easement donation transactions,99 this
alternative could lead to systematic underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds
to donees relative to the public investment in the easements. In addition, because
easements might not be accurately valued at the time of their extinguishment, this
alternative would not guarantee that a donee would receive the benefit of any postdonation relative appreciation in the value of an easement, or that the property
owner would receive only the dollar value of the property subject to the easement
at the time of the extinguishment. As with valuing improvements at
extinguishment, revaluing easements at extinguishment would give rise to a
number of difficult valuation issues.
1. Possibility of Systematic Underpayment of Donees
If a conservation easement is overvalued at the time of its donation, and
then accurately valued or undervalued at the time of its extinguishment, much of
the public investment in the easement through the deduction program could be lost
under this alternative. To illustrate, assume the following. A landowner donated a
conservation easement and claimed a deduction of $8 million, based on an abusive
99

On overvaluation in the nonsyndicated easement donation context, see, e.g., PBBM-Rose Hill,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 209-213 (5th Cir. 2018) (golf course conservation easement
had a value of $100,000, not the $15.16 million the taxpayer had claimed); Johnson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-79 (ranchland conservation easement had a value of $372,919,
not the $610,000 the taxpayer had claimed); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and
the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX. REV. 227, 249, 266 (2016) (discussing the persistent
problem of overvaluation of conservation easements). On overvaluation in the syndicated easement
donation transaction context, see, e.g., Senate Finance Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report,
supra note 10, at 105 (“The [syndicated easement donation] transactions discussed in this report
involve land valuations that appear so inflated above their original purchase prices that they cannot
reasonably be characterized as anything other than abusive tax shelters”). Professor Daniel Halperin,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, explains why conservation easements are “often
hard to appraise and easy to overvalue”:
The IRS regulations provide that, in the absence of comparable sales [of conservation
easements], a donor must generally look to the difference between the value of the property
before the restriction and the value of the property subject to the easement. This is
extremely difficult to determine because it is heavily fact specific. For example, it would
be necessary to determine what the zoning regulations are, whether they are likely to
change, and what sort of development was commercially feasible prior to the restrictions,
as well as other issues. That there is no standard form of easement exacerbates these
difficulties, as does the IRS’s lack of the resources required to wade through long
documents—drafted by hundreds of different attorneys—in order to determine exactly
what restrictions are in place….
See Halperin, supra note 13, 40-41.
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appraisal that indicated that the value of the property before the donation was $10
million, the value of the property after the donation was $2 million, and, thus,
accordingly to the appraisal, the easement represented 80% of the value of the
property as a whole at the time of its donation. Because of the IRS’s limited
resources, the claimed $8 million deduction was not challenged and the donor
received tax savings from the deduction of $2.8 million.100 A number of years later,
after the statute of limitations had run on the donor’s deduction, and without any
change in the actual value of the property or the easement, the easement is
extinguished in a judicial proceeding, the unencumbered property is sold in an
arm’s-length transaction for just $3 million (its fair market value101), and a
nonabusive appraisal indicates the easement has a value of only $750,000 and, thus,
represents only 25% of the value of the property as a whole.
If the donee were entitled to post-extinguishment proceeds equal to the
dollar value of the easement at the time of its extinguishment, the donee would
receive only $750,000, even though the donor had claimed that the easement had a
value of $8 million at the time of its donation and the public invested $2.8 million
in the easement through the deduction. This example illustrates that requiring that
a donee be entitled to the dollar value of a deductible easement at the time of its
extinguishment could lead to underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds to
donees relative to the public investment made in the easements. Given the persistent
problem of overvaluation in the § 170(h) deduction context and the limited ability
of the IRS to police valuation in our voluntary compliance tax system, this
alternative could result in systematic underpayment of post-extinguishment
proceeds to donees.102
In contrast, under the proceeds regulation, the donee in the example would
be entitled to at least 80% of the $3 million of post-extinguishment proceeds, or
$2.4 million. By requiring that the donee must always receive “at least” the
donation (or floor) percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds, the proceeds

100

This assumes, for simplicity purposes, that $2.8 million is the amount of income tax the donor
otherwise would have paid at an assumed flat rate of 35% absent the $8 million deduction. This
calculation ignores possible limitations, deductions, and other complexities not relevant here. Actual
tax savings in individual cases would depend on a variety of factors.
101
In the charitable contribution context, “fair market value” is defined as “the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-1(c)(2).
102
See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 13, at 40, 44 (the IRS “obviously can audit only a small sample
of all transactions”); Trends in the Internal Revenue Service’s Funding and Enforcement, Congress
of
the
United
States,
Congressional
Budget
Office
(July
2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-07/56422-CBO-IRS-enforcement.pdf (IRS enforcement
activities declined over the 2010-2018 period as IRS resources were reduced).
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regulation helps to protect the public’s investment in deductible easements that
were overvalued at the time of their donation and resulted in inflated deductions.
2. Valuation Difficulties
If the donee of a deductible conservation easement were entitled to postextinguishment proceeds equal to the dollar value of the easement at the time of its
extinguishment (or partial extinguishment, such as through condemnation of a strip
of property adjacent to a road), a number of valuation difficulties would arise. First,
the easement (or the part that is extinguished) would have to be valued as of the
date of the extinguishment. That valuation would give rise to many of the same
issues that would arise if improvements had to be valued as of the date of an
extinguishment; questions would arise regarding how the value would be
determined, the property owner and donee would have starkly opposing interests,
and it would be similarly difficult for the donee to successfully challenge the
property owner’s valuation of the easement.103
Moreover, additional difficulties would arise. A sale, exchange, or
involuntary conversion of the subject property may not occur for some years
following extinguishment of an easement, and the value of the easement on the date
of its extinguishment may not be determined until that later date, necessitating a
retrospective appraisal. Retrospective appraisals performed many years after the
effective valuation date can be particularly challenging because the appraiser may
be forced to try to ascertain market conditions and trends without readily available
or reliable data.
Partial extinguishments could be dealt with in different ways. For example,
the dollar value of the portion of the easement that is extinguished could be
determined for purposes of providing the donee its share of post-extinguishment
proceeds. Alternatively, the value of the entire easement relative to the value of the
property as a whole at the time of the extinguishment could be determined and the
donee could be entitled to that percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds.
Furthermore, portions of the subject property might be sold or exchanged at
different times following extinguishment of an easement, and that would raise
additional questions. The donee could be paid first from each allotment of postextinguishment proceeds until it received the full dollar value of the easement at its
extinguishment ($750,000 from the example immediately above). Alternatively,
the donee could be paid only a percentage of each allotment of post-extinguishment
proceeds until fully paid, with the percentage equal to the value of the easement at
its extinguishment relative to the value of the property as a whole at that time (25%
from the example immediately above).
103

See supra Part III.A.2(b).
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The proceeds regulation avoids the foregoing issues. There is no need under
the proceeds regulation to value an easement or part thereof as of the date of the
extinguishment, or to resolve the other issues outlined above. Rather,
implementation is simple—the donee is entitled to the minimum percentage of each
allotment of post-extinguishment proceeds.
C. The “Greater Of” Formula
Another possible alternative to the proceeds regulation formula would be to
require that the donee of a deductible conservation easement, following
extinguishment, be entitled to the greater of (1) the minimum percentage of any
post-extinguishment proceeds or (2) the dollar value of the easement at the time of
its extinguishment. This greater-of formula would comply with the proceeds
regulation because it would ensure that the donee would always receive “at least”
the minimum percentage of any post-extinguishment proceeds.104
As with the proceeds regulation, this alternative would help to protect the
public investment in easements that were overvalued at the time of their donation
by providing that the donee would always be entitled to at least the minimum
percentage of any post-extinguishment proceeds.105 This alternative would also
appear to ensure that the donee would receive the benefit of any post-donation
relative appreciation in the value of the easement.106 However, there are significant
drawbacks to this alternative.

104

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
To illustrate, consider again the example in which the landowner donated a conservation
easement, claimed a deduction of $8 million based on an abusive appraisal that indicated that the
easement represented 80% of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its donation, and
received tax savings from the deduction of $2.8 million. See supra Part III.B.1. A number of years
later, and without any change in the actual value of the property or the easement, the easement is
extinguished, the unencumbered property is sold for $3 million, and a nonabusive appraisal indicates
the easement has a value of only $750,000 and, thus, represents only 25% of the value of the property
as a whole. Id. Under the greater of alternative, the donee would be entitled to $2.4 million, which
is the greater of (1) the minimum percentage (80%) of the $3 million of post-extinguishment
proceeds, or $2.4 million, or (2) the dollar value of the easement at the time of its extinguishment
($750,000).
106
To illustrate, consider again the example in which the landowner donated a conservation
easement that represented 30% of the value of the property as a whole at the time of its donation,
and years later when the easement is extinguished it has a value of $3 million and represents 60%
of the value of the property as a whole. See supra Part III.A.2(a). The property is sold following
extinguishment for $5 million. Id. Under this alternative, the donee would be entitled to $3 million,
which is the greater of (1) the minimum percentage (30%) of the $5 million of post-extinguishment
proceeds, or $1.5 million, or (2) the $3 million dollar value of the easement at the time of its
extinguishment. This example assumes that the easement is correctly valued at the time of its
extinguishment.
105
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Donees would not necessarily receive the benefit of any post-donation
relative appreciation in the value of easements under this alternative because the
easements might not be accurately valued as of the date of their extinguishment.
All of the difficulties associated with valuing easements as of the date of their
extinguishment and the apportionment of proceeds would be present.107 In addition,
if the greater of formula permitted the value attributable to improvements to be
subtracted from post-extinguishment proceeds before calculating the donee’s
minimum percentage share, all of the difficulties associated with valuing
improvements as of the date of an extinguishment would also be present.108
Moreover, the likelihood that the various valuation issues would be resolved in a
manner that enriches property owners at the public’s expense would be high. The
proceeds regulation, with its simple and easy-to-implement formula, avoids all of
those issues.
D. Carve-Outs and Flexibility
A prospective conservation easement donor may prevent the donee from
receiving post-extinguishment proceeds attributable to improvements by excluding
or “carving out” from the easement the portions of the property on which
improvements are or in the future may be located (the improvement areas).109 There
are potential drawbacks to such carve-outs. From a conservation perspective, the
donee would not be able to limit intensive uses in the excluded areas, and in some
cases those intensive uses could negatively impact the conservation interests on the
property encumbered by the easement. For example, a busy gas station on an
excluded area could have significant negative effects on the conservation interests
on the adjacent property. In addition, from a deduction perspective, excluding the
improvement areas from an easement could reduce the donor’s deduction because
less acreage would be encumbered by the easement and the Treasury Regulations
require that an easement donor’s deduction be reduced to the extent that the
donation increases the value of other property owned by the donor or a related
person.110 The donation of a conservation easement might increase the value of the
excluded improvement areas because prospective purchasers are often willing to

107

See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part III.A.2(b).
109
A donee must be entitled to a share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, or
involuntary conversion of the property that is subject to the easement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A14(g)(6)(i). By excluding improvement areas from an easement, the donor ensures that the property
that is subject to the easement will not include improvements.
110
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). “Related person” is defined to include various familial,
entity, and trust relationships. See I.R.C. §§ 267(b), 707(b). For a discussion of these rules, see
McLaughlin, supra note 67, at 245-246.
108
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pay more for property that is adjacent to or otherwise benefits from permanently
protected undeveloped land.
The drawbacks to carve-outs could be addressed, at least in part, by having
the donor convey two easements: one nondeductible easement that restricts uses in
the excluded areas and a second deductible conservation easement encumbering the
remaining property. Alternatively, restrictions in the conservation easement
limiting access to the excluded areas may be sufficient to limit uses in those areas.
Some easement donors may consider the advantage associated with carveouts—preventing the donee from receiving post-extinguishment proceeds
attributable to improvements—to be worth the added cost and complexity. Others
may be comfortable proceeding with the donation of an easement that encumbers
areas in which improvements are or may be located given the improbability of an
extinguishment, particularly during the donor’s limited ownership period, and the
ability of the donor or subsequent property owner to benefit from any post-donation
relative appreciation in the value of the easement in the event of an extinguishment.
A donee working with a donor who wishes to exclude improvement areas
from a conservation easement could insist on the two-easement option to protect
the conservation interests on the property that will be encumbered by the easement.
The donee also could insist that the easement be drafted to include the “greater of”
formula discussed in Part III.C. to ensure that the donee would receive the full
benefit of any post-donation relative appreciation in the value of easement, given
that the donee would not be entitled to any proceeds attributable to improvements.
The donee could further negotiate to include provisions in the easement addressing
the various valuation issues that would arise.111 The proceeds regulation, with its
“at least” formulation, permits this flexibility and encourages donees to consider
the consequences of carve-outs and how best to protect the public interest and
investment in easements.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Congress’s Power to Condition Deductions
It is well-settled that Congress has the power to condition eligibility for a
federal deduction upon satisfaction of requirements Congress sees fit to impose—
including, in the case of a conservation easement donation, that the conservation

111

For example, the easement could authorize the donee to obtain the appraisal of the easement at
the time of extinguishment, mandate that each party pay half of the cost of the appraisal from that
party’s share of proceeds, and allow the donee to forego obtaining the appraisal if the donee deems
that the anticipated benefit would not justify the cost (that is, if property values in the area indicate
that there has not been any relative appreciation in the value of the easement).
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purpose of the contribution must be protected in perpetuity.112 Congress also has
the power to delegate to the Treasury the task of promulgating regulations
interpreting federal tax code requirements.113 A prospective conservation easement
donor who seeks to benefit from the § 170(h) deduction must meet the terms on
which the offer was held out.114 That is, the donor must draft the easement to
comply with the requirements of § 170(h) and, assuming they are procedurally and
substantively valid, the Treasury Regulations interpreting those requirements.
Whether a Treasury Regulation is valid is a separate issue from whether
Congress has the power to condition eligibility for a federal deduction. Congress
unquestionably has that power, even if qualifying for the deduction requires a
taxpayer to structure a charitable gift in a particular way.115 For example, in
Gillespie v. Commissioner, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of an
estate tax charitable deduction claimed with regard to the donation to a charity of a
remainder interest in a split-interest trust.116 The deduction was denied because the
trust did not meet the requirements of IRC § 2055(e)(2).117 Section 2055(e)(2)
authorizes a deduction for the donation to a charity of a remainder interest in a splitinterest trust only if the donation is made in the form of a charitable remainder
annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust, or a pooled income fund, each of
112
I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A). See, e.g., Feinberg v. Commissioner, 916 F.3d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 2019)
(“deductions ‘are matters of legislative grace specifically authorized by statute, and Congress has
unquestioned power to condition, limit, or deny deductions’”); Wisely v. United States, 893 F.2d
660, 666 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer seeking the
benefit of a deduction must show that every condition which Congress has seen fit to impose has
been fully satisfied”); J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1940)
(“Congress may condition deductions from gross income in any manner it sees fit”); Barbour Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1934) (“Congress has power to grant, restrict, or deny
deductions”); Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934) (“Unquestionably
Congress has power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in order to arrive at
the net that it chooses to tax”).
113
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Congress ... tasked
the Commissioner with promulgating rules to ensure that a conservation purpose [will] be protected
in perpetuity…. Acting pursuant to this authority, the Commissioner promulgated [Treasury
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1)-(6)]” (citations omitted)).
114
See, e.g., Wisely, 893 F.2d at 666 (“The taxpayer may not haggle with Congress; he either fits
squarely within the statute in every particular or the deduction is unavailable”); J.E. Riley Inv. Co.,
110 F.2d at 655 (“The taking of the deduction was a privilege granted the taxpayer; and in order to
avail himself of it he must meet the terms on which the offer was held out”); Barbour Coal Co., 74
F.2d at 163 (“the right to an asserted deduction must come within an applicable provision of the
statute, else it does not exist”).
115
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116
A split-interest trust is a trust that has both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Times They Are Not A-Changin’: Reforming the Charitable Split-Interest
Rules
(Again),
85
CHI.-KENT
L.
REV.
849,
862-863
(2010),
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol85/iss3/2/.
117
Gillespie v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 374 (1980).
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which must meet specific requirements set forth in the IRC. As with § 170(h),
Congress imposed the conditions in § 2055(e)(2) to protect against potential
abuse.118
In Gillespie, the estate that claimed the deduction argued that § 2055(e)(2)
abrogated a decedent’s right under state law to provide for the needs of an income
beneficiary and then pass any property remaining upon the beneficiary’s death to a
charity.119 The Tax Court rejected that argument, explaining that § 2055(e)(2) did
not have that effect.120 The court acknowledged that the creation and validity of
testamentary trusts is governed by State law, not the IRC.121 However, the court
explained that whether a particular transfer qualifies for a federal deduction is a
matter of federal concern, and § 2055(e)(2) merely prescribes the requirements that
must be met if a decedent wishes to obtain the benefit of a federal deduction for the
donation of a remainder interest to charity.122 In other words, the decedent was free
to structure the trust in any manner permissible under state law, but for his estate to
be eligible for a federal deduction, the trust had to meet the requirements Congress
saw fit to impose in § 2055(e)(2).
The same is true for a conservation easement donation. The donor is free to
draft the conservation easement in any manner permissible under applicable state
law. However, to be eligible for a federal charitable deduction, the easement must
meet the conditions Congress saw fit to impose in § 170(h), as interpreted by the
Treasury in regulations. One of those conditions requires the donor to agree in the
easement deed that the donee will be entitled to at least a minimum percentage of
the total amount of any post-extinguishment proceeds.
Mandating that the donee be entitled to at least a minimum percentage of
any post-extinguishment proceeds, including any proceeds attributable to
improvements, does not infringe upon the donor’s property rights under state law.
To be eligible for the § 170(h) deduction, part of the charitable gift that must be
made is the transfer to the donee of a right to a minimum percentage of the total
amount of any post-extinguishment proceeds. Moreover, a conservation easement
118

See id. at 377, 379 (“Congress found that charitable deductions were being allowed for transfers
which resulted in little or no benefit to charity”). Remainder interests in trusts, like conservation
easements, are partial interests in property and their donation similarly raises the possibility of
abuse.
119
Id. at 378.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 378-379.
122
Id. at 379. See also, e.g., Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, at *5 (“State law
determines the nature of the property rights, and Federal law determines the appropriate tax
treatment of those rights”); Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395, 404 (2012) (“State law determines only
which sticks are in a person’s bundle. . . . Once property rights are determined under State law, as
announced by the highest court of the State, the tax consequences are decided under Federal law”
(citations omitted)).
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donation is a voluntary act. A prospective easement donor who does not wish to
comply with the proceeds regulation need not make the donation or need not claim
a federal deduction for the donation. Alternatively, a prospective donor may
negotiate with the donee to exclude from the easement’s coverage the areas in
which improvements are or may be constructed, in which case the donee may insist
on drafting the easement to entitle it to benefit from any post-donation relative
appreciation in the value of the easement.123
The proceeds regulation also does not infringe upon a subsequent owner’s
property rights under state law. The purchase of property subject to a conservation
easement is also a voluntary act, and a prospective purchaser of such property will
have at least constructive notice of the terms of the easement. A prospective
purchaser concerned about the division of post-extinguishment proceeds as
provided in the easement deed need not purchase the property. Alternatively, the
prospective purchaser could offer to pay a slightly reduced purchase price to
address any perceived risk associated with that provision.
B. Condemnation Awards
While private property may not be taken for public use without the payment
of just compensation,124 owners of interests in property are generally free to enter
into enforceable agreements regarding the apportionment of condemnation
awards.125 Thus, upon the condemnation of property subject to a conservation
123

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest
and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897, 1904 (2008) (“The Taking Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, in part, that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation, and the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth
Amendment
applicable
to
the
states
and
their
political
subdivisions.”),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136963
[hereinafter,
Condemning
Conservation Easements].
125
See, e.g., United States v. 1.377 Acres of Land, 352 F.3d 1259, 1269 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
a lease to determine whether lessee was entitled to share in condemnation award and explaining that
“parties are free to contract around the eminent domain rules”); City of Roeland Park v. Jasan Trust,
132 P.3d 943, 948 (Kan. 2006) (“‘[T]he right of the lessee to compensation, as any other right, may
be waived or contracted away by the terms of the lease’”); State by Humphrey v. Kouri, 415 N.W.2d
412, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (owner of billboards on condemned land not entitled to eminent
domain proceeding to determine their value; lease with landowner treated billboards as personal
property, which was not compensable, and “[p]arties may contract away their right to compensation
in an eminent domain proceeding”); State Highway Dep't of Ga. v. Ivey, 120 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ga.
1961) (property owner’s agreement with highway department precluded a claim for damages to his
other property by reason of construction work on the land that had been conveyed to the Highway
Department); Honey Properties, Inc. v. City of Gastonia, 114 S.E.2d 344 (N.C. 1960) (contract
between restaurant owner and city precluded compensation to restaurant owner for sewer lines when
territory containing lines was annexed to the city).
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easement, the terms of the easement will generally control apportionment of the
condemnation award. The donee’s entitlement under the easement to at least the
mandated minimum percentage of the total condemnation award, including the
portion of the award attributable to improvements, would not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation because the
donor voluntarily entered into the apportionment agreement by donating a § 170(h)compliant conservation easement. In addition, any subsequent property owner
would also have voluntarily entered into the apportionment agreement by
purchasing the property subject to, and with at least constructive notice of, the
easement.
Some states have statutes that specifically address the apportionment of a
condemnation award upon the taking of property subject to a conservation
easement. In a few states, those statutes provide for payment of the full
condemnation award to the property owner, meaning the donee would receive
nothing.126 The proceeds regulation addresses this possibility by providing that the
donee need not be entitled to a percentage of the post-extinguishment proceeds
from an involuntary conversion “if state law provides that the donor is entitled to
the full proceeds from the conversion without regard to the terms of the prior
[easement].”127 An “involuntary conversion” includes the loss of property through
condemnation.128
In some states, a statute may provide that, upon the taking of property
subject to a conservation easement, the donee shall receive a specified share of the
condemnation award and that share might be smaller than the share the donee is
required to receive under the proceeds regulation. For example, Virginia’s version
of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides that, in an eminent domain
proceeding, “the holder of the conservation easement shall be compensated for the
value of the easement.”129 It is possible that the value of an easement at the time of
its condemnation may be a smaller dollar amount than the minimum percentage of
the total condemnation award. However, a donor might be able to nonetheless
comply with the proceeds regulation in such a state by agreeing in the easement
deed to transfer to the holder whatever portion of the donor’s share of a
condemnation award is necessary to ensure that the holder receives the required
minimum percentage of the total condemnation award.
Even if a state eminent domain statute were deemed to preclude compliance
with the proceeds regulation, that should not render the proceeds regulation
unenforceable or unconstitutional. Rather, it should mean that a conservation
126

For a discussion of those statutes, see Condemning Conservation Easements, supra note 124, at
1961-1964.
127
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
128
See supra note 65.
129
Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1010(F).
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easement governed by the statute would not be eligible for the federal deduction.
Wachter v. Commissioner is illustrative.130 In Wachter, the Tax Court held that a
North Dakota statute, which limits the duration of any easement created in the state
after July 1, 1977, to a maximum of 99 years, prevents conservation easements in
the state from being granted in perpetuity.131 Accordingly, donors of conservation
easements in North Dakota cannot qualify for the § 170(h) deduction.132
In Wachter, the Tax Court reiterated the fundamental principle that, while
state law determines the nature of property rights, it is federal law that determines
the federal tax treatment of those rights.133 Wachter also confirmed that a state
statute can render all conservation easement donations in the state ineligible for the
federal deduction. State legislatures are, of course, free to change their laws to allow
for the creation of conservation easements that satisfy § 170(h) requirements and,
thus, enable their citizens to benefit from the federal deduction.
C. Conservation Easements Encumber Improvements
Taxpayers have argued that the proceeds regulation should not be
interpreted to require that the donee receive a percentage of post-extinguishment
proceeds attributable to improvements because conservation easements apply only
to the land they encumber and not to any improvements thereon.134 As a result,
taxpayers have argued, the reference in the proceeds regulation to the proceeds from
a sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of “the subject property” refers to the
proceeds from the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the underlying land
only, and not the improvements thereon.135
The Tax Court rejected that argument in Belair Woods, LLC v.
Commissioner on statutory and regulatory as well as commonsense grounds. The
court explained that the use restrictions in a conservation easement deed apply, not
only to the subject land, but also to any existing and future improvements on that
130

Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 140 (2014).
Id. See N.D. Cent. Code § 47-05-02.1(2) (“Real property easements, servitudes, or any
nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property, which become binding after July 1, 1977,
shall be subject to the requirements of this section. These requirements are deemed a part of any
agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document of agreement….
The duration of the easement, servitude, or nonappurtenant restriction on the use of real property
must be specifically set out, and in no case may the duration of any interest in real property regulated
by this section exceed ninety-nine years.”).
132
The Tax Court noted that “[b]oth parties allege that the State law at issue here is unique because
this is the only State that has a law that provides for a maximum duration that may not be overcome
by agreement.” Wachter, 142 T.C. at 147.
133
Id., citing United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722, 105 S.Ct. 2919, 86
L.Ed.2d 565 (1985).
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See Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112.
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See id., at *14.
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land.136 As examples, the court noted that the easement deed in Belair imposed a
variety of restrictions on the improvements permitted under the deed, such as
specifying the location of residential driveways and utility lines, including water,
septic, and power lines.137
The Tax Court was clearly correct. Unless the land on which improvements
are or will be located is excluded from a deductible conservation easement, the
easement deed will impose restrictions on the improvements. A conservation
easement deed generally will include an overarching restriction that requires any
use of the land—including the maintenance or construction of improvements on the
land—to be consistent with the conservation purposes of the donation and not
harmful to the specific conservation interests associated with the land.138 The deed
also generally will impose additional restrictions on individual improvements, as in
Belair. To provide additional examples, permitted permanent structures, such as
single-family residences, guest houses, and agricultural structures, are generally
subject to number, location, size, and height restrictions, as well as restrictions on
their replacement or expansion; there may be limits or prohibitions on paving
access roads or driveways and square footage limitations on other impermeable
surfaces; and fencing may be restricted in numerous ways, including its location
and type, such as requiring that it be wildlife-friendly.139 Restrictions on
improvements are integral to a conservation easement; they are key to protecting
the specific conservation interests associated with the land and accomplishing the
conservation purpose of the easement.
The Tax Court in Belair also explained that including the value attributable
to improvements in the post-extinguishment proceeds to be shared by the donee is
consistent with a commonsense understanding of the language in the proceeds
regulation, which refers to the proceeds from the sale, exchange, or involuntary
conversion “of the subject property.”140 The court explained that owners of real
estate do not typically sell roads, driveways, ponds, or buried utility lines separately
from the real estate on which those improvements are situated.141 If the property is
sold, the sales proceeds are necessarily attributable both to the land and any
136

Id.
Id. at *16.
138
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (the “interest in the property retained by the donor (and the
donor’s successors in interest) must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions . . . that will prevent
uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation”); id. §
1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3) (the terms of the easement must not permit uses that are destructive of
conservation interests, subject to one limited exception).
139
See, e.g., Fencing With Wildlife in Mind, Colorado Division of Wildlife (Dec. 2009), available
at
https://wildlifefriendly.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/fencingwithwildlifeinmind_coloradodow.pdf.
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Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112, at *16, n. 6.
141
Id.
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attached improvements.142 The same is true for structures, such as residences, guest
houses, barns, and fencing. That is, owners of real estate do not typically sell such
structures separately from the real estate on which they are situated.
D. Bright-Line Rule
In a few cases involving conservation easement deeds that provide for
subtraction of the value attributable to improvements before calculating the donee’s
percentage of post-extinguishment proceeds, taxpayers have argued that the
subtraction language is “effectively a nullity” or “empty verbiage” because the
easements permit only limited future improvements and those improvements would
either not increase the value of the subject property or any such increase would be
“truly de minimis.”143 The Tax Court, in Orders, ruled that those assertions are
plausible and denied the IRS’s motions for summary judgment on the issue.144 The
improvements permitted by the easements involved in these cases include, for
example, a trail for use by hikers and bicyclists on 42-acres, small recreational-only
structures, fire breaks, drainage ditches, and gravel and other permeable-surfaced
roads.145
There are a number of problems with the approach to the proceeds
regulation adopted in these Orders. First, as the Tax Court stated in Belair Woods,
LLC v. Commissioner in response to the supposed-worthlessness-of-improvements
argument, “[i]t is hard to understand why the draftsperson would have included this
language if [the taxpayer] had believed that its anticipated improvements would not
enhance the property’s value.”146 In the case of the easements at issue in the Orders,
as just one example, “forestry” is permitted and forest roads can be particularly
valuable improvements.147 Second, it is not clear what would constitute a “truly de
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Id.
St. Andrews Plantation, LLC v. Commissioner, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 13,
14 (Nov. 16, 2020); Oconee Landing Property, LLC v. Commissioner, Tax Court Order, Docket No.
11814-19, at 6 (Aug. 18, 2020).
144
St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 14; Oconee Landing
Property, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 6.
145
St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 6-7; Oconee Landing
Property, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 3.
146
Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 *17. The court in Belair explained:
It is true that money spent to improve property does not necessarily produce a dollar-fordollar increase in the FMV of the property. But it does not follow that a combination of
roads, driveways, irrigation systems, water pipes, electric cables, and septic systems would
have no effect on the FMV of the conserved area. Id. at *18, n.7.
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St. Andrews Plantation, Tax Court Order, Docket No. 20849-17, at 6; Oconee Landing Property,
Tax Court Order, Docket No. 11814-19, at 3. See, e.g., Deborah A. Layton, et al., Cost Estimators
for Construction of Forest Roads in Central Appalachians, USDA, Forest Service Research Paper
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minimis” increase in value. Different revenue agents and courts might come to
different conclusions on the matter, leading to inconsistent and inequitable
enforcement of the proceeds regulation.
Third, as Tax Court explained in Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that the
proceeds regulation’s meaning is unambiguous as to improvements: Their
value cannot be subtracted…. Here, the deed explicitly allows for
improvements to be made to the property and allows any value derived from
those improvements to be subtracted from the proceeds of a judicial
extinguishment before the donee receives its share…. Whether those
improvements will add value to the property at some point “in perpetuity”
is an unknowable speculation and not a question of fact for this Court to
address.148
Given the perpetual life of a conservation easement and that an extinguishment
might occur 75, 100, or 200 years following a donation, the potential value of future
improvements is “unknowable speculation.” Revenue agents and the courts should
not be required to speculate as to the value, at some remote and unknowable date
in the future, of, for example, roads, trails, firebreaks, or recreational structures, or
improvements that might be permitted via amendment.149
The supposed-worthlessness-of-improvements argument is similar to the
argument addressed in Mitchell v Commissioner, in which the Tenth Circuit held
that failure to obtain a mortgage subordination agreement at the time of an
easement’s donation was fatal to the deduction, despite the taxpayer’s argument
that the risk of her defaulting on the mortgage (and the easement being
extinguished) was so remote as to be negligible given her financial circumstances
and credit history.150 The Tenth Circuit explained: “it is reasonable for the
Commissioner to adopt an easily-applied subordination requirement over a caseby-case, fact-specific inquiry into the financial strength or credit history of each
NE-665, 1 (“The construction of forest roads is the most expensive and time-consuming task
involved in forest operations”).
148
Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116, at *14-*15. See also Belair
Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 *17, n. 7 (“[the taxpayer] can only speculate
about the future value of the specific improvements it has retained the right to make but has not yet
made”).
149
On amendments to conservation easements, see, e.g., Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v.
Commissioner, 978 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2020); Chief Counsel Advisory AM 2020-001 (March 27,
2020); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amendment Clauses in Easements: Ensuring Protection in
Perpetuity, 168 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 819 (August 3, 2020). Pine Mountain Preserve is controlling
in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
150
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015).
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taxpayer.”151 It was similarly reasonable for the Commissioner to adopt an easilyapplied proceeds requirement over a case-by-case, fact-specific and inherently
speculative inquiry into the nature and value of possible future improvements. The
IRS reviews millions of tax returns each year for audit potential, and bright-line
rules, like the mortgage subordination and proceeds requirements, help to make that
process manageable. Accordingly, a conservation easement deed that provides for
the subtraction of the value attributable to improvements before calculating the
donee’s share of post-extinguishment proceeds should not be eligible for a
deduction. Taxpayers who are denied deductions on this ground can seek redress
from the easement’s draftsperson.
E. Enforcement is Critical
In a recent case involving the denial of a § 170(h) deduction for failure to
comply with the proceeds regulation, Tax Court Judge Holmes made some
statements regarding § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations that are concerning and
warrant comment.152 He stated that, in recent years, the Commissioner has
“attacked” a popular form of charitable contribution—the donation of conservation
easements.153 He suggested that cases involving challenges to deductions claimed
under § 170(h) should be resolved “case-by-case in contests of valuation.”154 He
also stated that the Tax Court majority’s holding that the proceeds regulation is
valid “will likely deny any charitable deduction to hundreds or thousands of
taxpayers who donated the conservation easements that protect perhaps millions of
acres.”155 Those statements are concerning for a number of reasons.
At two separate points in the past two decades, Congress has called upon
the IRS to increase enforcement of the requirements of § 170(h) and the Treasury
Regulations. The first call for stepped-up enforcement came after the Washington
Post published a series of articles in 2003 and 2004 describing a variety of abuses
in the nonsyndicated easement donation context.156 The second call for stepped-up
151

Id. at 9.
See Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 (Oakbrook I);
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. No. 10 (2020) (Oakbrook II). In
Oakbrook I, which was authored by Judge Holmes, the tax court sustained the IRS’s complete
disallowance of a $9,545,000 deduction claimed for a conservation easement donation because the
easement did not comply with the proceeds regulation. In Oakbrook II, in which Judge Homes
dissented, the majority, consisting of twelve judges, held that the proceeds regulation was both
procedurally and substantively valid.
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Oakbrook, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *1.
154
Oakbrook, 154 T.C. at 126.
155
Id. at 82.
156
For some of the articles describing abuses, see, e.g., Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway,
Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/12/21/developers-find-payoff-in152
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enforcement was made more recently in response to the increase in abusive
syndicated easement donation transactions.157 Accordingly, IRS enforcement
efforts are not an “attack” on conservation easement donations. Rather, they are
congressionally-encouraged attempts to curb abuses and ensure public benefit in
this partial interest donation context. The attack on conservation easements is more
preservation/8add5325-7f4a-41ad-88ad-55aa1ca8bdf0/; Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale
Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable Deduction, WASH.
POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/12/forowners-of-upscale-homes-loophole-pays/1957fc0f-44ad-45c1-8ac6-0b6fe85dc17d/; Joe Stephens,
Local Laws Already Bar Alterations, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A15,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/12/local-laws-already-baralterations/aacd9e52-9757-47eb-92e2-0657bd219d42/; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into Big
Business,
WASH.
POST,
Dec.
13,
2004,
at
A1,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/13/tax-break-turns-into-bigbusiness/1097faeb-e789-4a22-b22c-e74ba9a48844/. On Congress’s response, see, e.g., Joe
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, IRS Toughens Scrutiny of Land Gifts, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at
A1 (the Senate Finance Committee began investigating easement transactions in 2003 and
Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley stated “the investigation's findings so far demand …
stronger
enforcement
by
the
IRS”),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/07/01/irs-toughens-scrutiny-of-landgifts/04677e57-810f-443d-9ef4-493544136b45/; Joe Stephens, Senators Vow to End Tax Break on
Easements, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2004, at A3, (Senators Grassley and Baucus “called for the IRS
to make audits of easement deductions a priority”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A8794-2004Dec17.html; Joe Stephens, IRS Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2005 (reporting on a Senate Finance Committee hearing on conservation easement
abuses),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/06/09/irs-starts-team-oneasement-abuses/bce00d7f-5d12-40be-86c4-9876b58c85a7/; Options to Improve Tax Compliance
and Reform Tax Expenditures, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS-2-05, 281 (Jan.
27,
2005)
(recommending
a
variety
of
reforms
to
Congress),
https://www.jct.gov/publications/2005/jcs-2-05/; Report of Staff Investigation of The Nature
Conservancy (Volume I), Executive Summary, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (June 2005)
(recommending that the IRS take a number of actions to address abuses),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Prt109-27.pdf.
157
In a recent bipartisan investigative report, the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Senate
Finance Committee concluded “the IRS has strong reason for taking enforcement action against
syndicated conservation-easement transactions as it has to date … [and] … Congress, the IRS, and
Department of the Treasury should take further action to preserve the integrity of the conservationeasement tax deduction.” Senate Finance Committee Bipartisan Investigative Report, supra note
10, at 4. See also, e.g., Richard Rubin & Brody Mullins, Land-Tax Deal Promoters Lobby Congress
After IRS Crackdown, WALL ST. J. (March 28, 2017) (quoting Senator Ron Wyden: “the IRS must
continue to work to ensure that this critical program does not fall victim to tax cheats whose only
goal is to sell tax shelters to the highest bidder”), https://www.wsj.com/articles/land-tax-dealpromoters-lobby-congress-after-irs-crackdown-1490717906; Finance Committee Releases Report
on Syndicated Conservation-Easement Transactions, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Aug. 25,
2020), at https://bit.ly/3m69N6T (quoting Senator Ron Wyden: “cracking down on abusive
syndicated conservation easements requires ensuring IRS has the resources and legal tools to do its
job”).
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properly viewed as coming from taxpayers, land trusts, and attorneys who represent
them that seek to take advantage of the § 170(h) deduction while avoiding the
conditions Congress imposed on the deduction to protect the public interest.
Judge Holmes also appeared to suggest that the role of the IRS and the
courts in the § 170(h) context should be limited to ensuring that a deductible
easement is conveyed to a qualified organization and to checking value. However,
as explained in Part II, that is precisely what Congress chose not to do when it
enacted § 170(h). Congress deliberately did not rely on the status of the donee as a
qualified organization to ensure that a deductible easement would be a restriction
(granted in perpetuity) on the use that may be made of the real property, or that the
easement would satisfy the conservation purposes test, or that the conservation
purpose of the contribution would be protected in perpetuity. Rather, each of those
requirements is separate and distinct and each must be satisfied independently of
the qualified organization requirement.
In addition, neither the status of donees as qualified organizations nor the
accurate valuation of conservation easements would ensure that easements actually
“protect” millions of acres. The level of protection that a conservation easement
provides is largely dependent upon whether the easement is drafted to comply with
the granted-in-perpetuity, conservation purpose, and protected-in-perpetuity
requirements. For example, to comply with those requirements, the easement must
not authorize uses that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the
donation;158 the easement must not authorize uses that could injure or destroy the
property’s specific conservation interests, with one limited exception;159 the
easement, if it is an open space easement, must not permit a degree of intrusion or
future development that would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land
or with the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation;160
the easement must prohibit surface mining and any other method of mining that
could harm conservation interests;161 the easement must prohibit its transfer except
to other eligible donees that agree to continue to carry out the conservation purpose
of the contribution;162 the easement must grant the donee the requisite notice,
access, and enforcement rights;163 and the easement can be extinguishable only in
a judicial proceeding upon a finding by the court of impossibility or impracticality,
and the donee must be entitled to at least the specified minimum percentage of any
post-extinguishment proceeds and must be required to use those proceeds in a
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Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2)-(3).
160
Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v).
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I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4).
162
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manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution.164
Reducing compliance with § 170(h) to checking the status of the donee as a
qualified organization and checking value would strip the section of these and other
requirements, each of which was considered essential to the integrity and
effectiveness of the deduction program.165 Moreover, valuation disputes present
their own set of challenges.166
Taxpayers also are not without tools to ensure compliance with § 170(h)
requirements. In addition to the plain language of the proceeds regulation, before a
donation is made, a taxpayer can obtain a private letter ruling from the IRS that the
terms of the conservation easement deed comply with all requirements.167 In the
reported cases to date in which deductions have been denied due to a noncompliant
proceeds clause, the claimed deductions ranged from $1.2 million to $155.5
million, with an average deduction of approximately $15.5 million.168 Ordinary
164

Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i)-(ii).
A deductible easement must also comply with the mortgage subordination and baseline
documentation requirements. See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (5).
166
See, e.g., Boltar v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326, 335 (2011) (“The problem is created by [the]
willingness [of appraisers] to use their resumes and their skills to advocate the position of the party
who employs them without regard to objective and relevant facts, contrary to their professional
obligations”); Michael R. Devitt A Dip in the Hot Tub: Concurrent Evidence Techniques for Expert
Witnesses in Tax Court Cases, 117 J. TAX’N 213 (2012) (“appearance of separately testifying
government- and taxpayer-retained expert witnesses only perpetuates the enduring concerns of
trustworthiness, partiality, and litigation lethargy while exacerbating the challenge of reaching the
right results”). See also Lee A. Sheppard, Clamping Down on Conservation Easement Shelters, TAX
NOTES FEDERAL, 1753, 1761 (“Valuation cases are a crapshoot, because a court could be enchanted
by photos of a scenic plot of land”).
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taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are generally made public after all information has been removed
that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued. See IRS, Understanding IRS Guidance – A
Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer.
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The claimed deduction amounts, largest to smallest, were as follows: Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC
v. Commissioner, 153 T.C. 126 (2019) ($155,500,000); Plateau Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2020-93 ($25,449,000); Glade Creek Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2020-148 ($17,504,000); R.R. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-22
($16,000,000); PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018) ($15,160,000);
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-54 ($9,545,000); Woodland
Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-55 ($8,703,000); Lumpkin HC, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-95 ($8,242,000); TOT Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,
T.C. Bench Op. (Dec. 13, 2019) ($6,900,000); Maple Landing, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2020-104 ($6,791,000); Smith Lake, LLC, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-107 ($6,524,000);
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v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-112 ($4,778,000); Englewood Place, LLC v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2020-105 ($4,773,000); Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020115 ($4,592,000); Red Oak Estates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-116 ($4,343,000);
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prudence suggests that taxpayers planning to claim such sizable deductions should
have sought rulings from the IRS approving the conservation easement deeds
before the donations were made. Seeking a private letter ruling would seem
particularly appropriate in syndicated easement donation transactions, where
interests are sold to investors and representations presumably are made regarding
compliance with § 170(h) requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
After § 170(h) was enacted in 1980, the Treasury faced a difficult
problem—how to ensure, following extinguishment of a deductible perpetual
conservation easement, that the conservation purpose of the contribution would be
protected in perpetuity. Requiring that the donee receive proceeds equal to the value
of the easement at the time of its extinguishment and use those proceeds for similar
conservation purposes elsewhere would, at first glance, appear to be the most
sensible solution. However, due to the persistent problem of overvaluation of
easements at the time of their donation, that rule could lead to systematic
underpayment of post-extinguishment proceeds to donees relative to the public
investment made in the easements. It also would entail significant future valuation
difficulties that would likely be resolved in a manner disadvantageous to donees
and, by extension, the public. The proceeds regulation avoids those problems and
provides additional benefits.
By providing that the donee must be entitled to a percentage of any postextinguishment proceeds, rather than the dollar value of an easement at its donation,
the proceeds regulation ensures that the donee will benefit from appreciation in the
value of the property as a whole following the donation. In addition, an easement
may appreciate in value relative to the property as a whole following its donation,
and not subtracting the value attributable to improvements before calculating the
donee’s percentage share of post-extinguishment proceeds can temper the perverse
incentive property owners may have to seek extinguishment to benefit from that
relative appreciation. Not subtracting the value attributable to improvements also
avoids the future difficulties associated with valuing improvements or appreciation
in the value thereof.
The proceeds regulation also is not inherently unfair to donors or subsequent
property owners. A variety of unpredictable variables can affect the amount of postextinguishment proceeds and, depending on the facts, the regulation can financially
benefit donors and subsequent property owners. Furthermore, a conservation
easement donation is a voluntary act, and a prospective easement donor who does
not wish to comply with the proceeds regulation or any of the other conditions that
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-89 ($2,788,000); Lumpkin One Five Six, LLC v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2020-94 ($2,483,000); Carroll v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 196 (2016) ($1,200,000).
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Congress and the Treasury imposed on the deduction to safeguard the public
interest need not make the donation or need not claim the deduction. The purchase
of property subject to a deductible conservation easement also is a voluntary act,
and a prospective purchaser concerned about the division of post-extinguishment
proceeds or other of the easement’s terms need not purchase the property, or could
offer to pay a reduced purchase price to address any perceived risks or
inconveniences.
In sum, the proceeds regulation contains a simple and easy-to-implement
rule: whenever a deductible easement is extinguished in whole or in part, the donee
must be entitled to at least the specified minimum percentage of any postextinguishment proceeds and must use those proceeds to advance similar
conservation purposes elsewhere. There is no need to grapple with appraisals,
opposing interests, or other difficult valuation issues. The rule also is neither
irrational nor inherently unfair. Considered in light of the unpredictable variables,
the alternatives, the potential incentive on the part of property owners to seek
extinguishments, and the goal of protecting the public investment in conservation,
the proceeds regulation provides a reasonable solution to the difficult problem of
ensuring that the conservation purpose of a contribution will be protected in
perpetuity.

45
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3760530

